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Abstract Transboundary river basins experience complex coordination challenges during droughts. The
multiscale nature of drought creates potential for spillovers when upstream adaptation decisions have
cascading impacts on downstream regions. This paper advances the institutional analysis and development
(IAD) framework to examine drought adaptation decision-making in a multijurisdictional context. We
integrate concepts of risk management into the IAD framework to characterize drought across its natural and
human dimensions. A global analysis identiﬁes regions where severe droughts combine with institutional
fragmentation to require coordinated adaptation. We apply the risk-based IAD framework to examine
drought adaptation in the Rio Bravo/Grande—an archetypical transboundary river shared by the United
States and Mexico and by multiple states within each country. The analysis draws on primary data and a
questionnaire with 50 water managers in four distinct, yet interlinked, “institutional catchments,” which vary
in terms of their drought characteristics, socioeconomic attributes, and governance arrangements. The
results highlight the heterogeneity of droughts and uneven distribution of their impacts due to the interplay
of drought hazards and institutional fragmentation. Transboundary water sharing agreements inﬂuence the
types and sequence of interactions between upstream and downstream jurisdictions, which we describe
as spillovers that involve both conﬂict and cooperation. Interdependent jurisdictions often draw on informal
decision-making venues (e.g., data sharing, operational decisions) due to the higher transaction costs and
uncertainty associated with courts and planning processes, yet existing coordination and conﬂict resolution
venues have proven insufﬁcient for severe, sustained droughts. Observatories will be needed to measure and
manage the cascading risks of drought.
1. Introduction
Droughts are a recurring natural hazard with cascading direct and indirect economic impacts
(Freire-González et al., 2017). Climate change is projected to bring more frequent and severe droughts, par-
ticularly to midlatitude regions (Prudhomme et al., 2014). In this context, there is increasing focus on the
human dimensions of drought which shape vulnerability and the distribution of impacts across society and
scales (Kallis, 2008). A growing appreciation of the human dimensions of drought has led interdisciplinary
researchers to claim that we have reached a “watershed moment” that requires “rethink[ing] the concept
of drought to include the human role in mitigating and enhancing drought,” including the role of people
inﬂuencing drought events, not just responding to their consequences (Van Loon et al., 2016, p. 89).
Recent research has begun to ﬁll this gap by improving our understanding about the channels throughwhich
people inﬂuence drought including anthropogenic climate change and patterns of land use, irrigation, dam
building, and water abstraction (Van Loon et al., 2016). Despite these strides, limited work has focused on the
role of institutional fragmentation in transboundary river basins, where decisions in one jurisdiction can have
cascading impacts upstream or downstream. The interactions between people and drought are governed by
institutions, including rules and norms about the distribution of drought risks and water shortages, which
adds a layer of fragmentation to drought characterization and management in the Anthropocene. Severe
droughts can trigger decisions that exacerbate pre-existing vulnerability and lead to disputes between user
groups and neighboring jurisdictions, particularly during sustained droughts.
This paper ﬁlls this gap by advancing the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework to charac-
terize and assess adaptation to droughts in a transboundary context. It focuses on droughts and related
socioeconomic and environmental disturbances and compares institutional arrangements for coordinating
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adaptation decision-making across political borders and levels of governance. The framework is applied to
the Rio Bravo (Mexico)/Rio Grande (United States), a multijurisdictional river basin shared by two countries
and the states within them. Mexico and the United States exhibit different levels of decentralization, which
offers an ideal laboratory to illustrate key challenges associated with drought adaptation in transboundary
river basins globally.
We utilize a multimethod research strategy to address the following questions:
1. How do transboundary water agreements inﬂuence drought vulnerability?
2. How do droughts affect interactions (conﬂict and cooperation) between upstream and downstream jur-
isdictions and between the central government and local actors?
3. Which types of decision-making venues coordinate adaptation in transboundary rivers, and how effective
are they perceived to be?
The structure of the paper is as follows. The rest of this section introduces the IAD framework and extends it
by integrating concepts from the risk management and natural hazards literature. This analysis illustrates the
multiscale and multijurisdictional nature of drought. It also provides a typology of informal and formal coor-
dination institutions to facilitate cooperation and conﬂict resolution in transboundary drought adaptation.
The second section provides the research setting and methodology. It introduces a two-level analysis of
drought severity and institutional fragmentation in transboundary river basins; this section maps the world’s
federal rivers and identiﬁes transboundary river basins affected by severe, sustained droughts according to
the drought severity index. This analysis highlights the Rio Grande/Bravo as an ideal setting for exploring
the design and effectiveness of institutional adaptation to droughts due to its history of severe droughts
and its transboundary coordination challenges within and between countries. The third section examines
evidence for three propositions based on an observatory of drought adaptation in the Rio Grande/Bravo,
drawing from primary data on drought characteristics and a questionnaire (n = 50) for water managers
involved in adaptation decision-making at different levels of governance. The ﬁnal section examines the
implications for institutional analysis and development, particularly related to trade-offs between local and
transboundary adaptation and concludes with implications for theory and practice.
1.1. Droughts and Decision-Making: An Institutional Analysis
We examine decision-making and risk management from the perspective of institutional analysis and com-
mon pool resource governance theory. The institutional analysis and development framework was devel-
oped by an interdisciplinary group of scholars over the past 35 years. The framework guides systematic
comparisons of institutions and governance arrangements (Ostrom, 2011). Institutions are deﬁned as the
shared prescriptions (including rules and norms) that structure human interactions, following Ostrom
(2005). The framework focuses on action situations (Figure 1), which capture interdependent decisions
among actors and how actors respond to risks and incentives in the context of a wider set of rules, commu-
nity attributes, and biophysical conditions. Action situations occur at nested levels of action: operational, col-
lective choice, and constitutional. The operational level involves daily activities, such as diverting water or
harvesting crops. The collective choice level entails coordination, rule-making, and compliance activities
for the operational level, such as monitoring of water diversions. Finally, the constitutional choice level gov-
erns rule making and compliance activities for the collective choice level, such as developing a river manage-
ment authority or deﬁning who may participate in rule making (Ostrom, 2005).
The IAD framework has been applied across a diverse range of settings frommunicipal governance to natural
resources and the digital commons to study how different conﬁgurations of rules affect patterns of interac-
tions among actors and the outcomes they realize (McGinnis, 2011). The growing complexity, scale, and pace
of social and environmental change have prompted efforts to extend and expand the IAD framework to
understand the dynamics and sustainability of large-scale human natural systems (Fleischman et al., 2014;
Stern, 2011; Villamayor-Tomas et al., 2014).
Over the past 10 years, the IAD framework has been expanded into frameworks for assessing the robustness
and resilience of social-ecological systems (SES) and coupled infrastructure systems (Anderies et al., 2016;
McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). Doing so has required accounting for biophysical and social complexity, which
were treated as “external variables” in the original formulation of the IAD. In these broadening frameworks,
external variables have been described in many different ways, including “contextual factors,” “exogenous
drivers,” and “functional infrastructures” (Anderies et al., 2016).
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The SES framework sought to enhance our understanding of SES by unpacking their complexity using a con-
sistent set of variables and metrics to support hypothesis testing, theory development, and comparative
learning. The framework examines SES in terms of the interactions between natural and human dimensions,
including four distinct, yet interrelated, “subsystems”: resource systems, resource units, actors, and govern-
ance arrangements (Ostrom, 2009; McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). These analytical distinctions can facilitate
ﬁner-grained classiﬁcation of external variables to examine how well different institutional arrangements
respond to disturbances, such as drought (Brown et al., 2016), and to external factors, such as regional and
global scale physical social and economic forces (de Loë & Patterson, 2018).
We build on the recent merger of the IAD and SES into a combined (IAD-SES) framework as our point of depar-
ture (McCord et al., 2017). The IAD-SES framework combines elements of both frameworks to counteract the
weaknesses of each when applied on its own. The IAD captures the dynamics and feedbacks associated with
the action situation but lacks capacity to fully represent the complexity of biophysical and socioeconomic
attributes. The SES framework offers a more comprehensive accounting of natural and social systems and
their constituent attributes, but moving beyond static assessment to dynamic, adaptive systems have proven
to be more difﬁcult than envisioned. Hence, their combination (Figure 1) incorporates (a) the subsystems of
the SES framework (explanatory factors on the left side of the framework) with (b) the dynamics of action
situations (interactions, outcomes, and their feedbacks on the right side of the framework).
Our analysis of drought adaptation in a transboundary context involves two advances. First, we incorporate
concepts from risk management into the IAD-SES to characterize drought according to their natural and
human dimensions: hazard, exposure, and vulnerability (Carrão et al., 2016; Field et al., 2012). Hazards refer
to “the potential occurrence of natural or human-induced physical event that may cause loss…” (Field et
al., 2012: p. 560), which has been operationalized for drought to capture the intensity and duration of deﬁcits
in rainfall, runoff, and/or soil moisture (Wilhite, 2000); drought hazards are represented in the IAD-SES frame-
work as attributes of the resource system and resource units, including the spatial and temporal distribution
of water availability and the predictability of system dynamics (Table 1). Exposure refers to the “presence of
people; livelihoods; environmental services and resources; infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural
assets in places that could be adversely affected” (Field et al., 2012, p. 559) which involves attributes of
resource systems, their units and actors, such as the human-constructed facilities, the economic value of
water use, and the dependency of actors and their regional economies on water respectively. Finally, vulner-
ability captures the “propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected” (Field et al., 2012, p. 564) and is
shaped by attributes of the actors (e.g., knowledge) and governance arrangements (e.g., property rights
and operational rules; Smit & Wandel, 2006). Thus, a risk-based IAD-SES framework involves a diagnosis of
Figure 1. Characterizing drought in a transboundary context: A risk-based IAD-SES framework (Source: own elaboration, building on McCord et al., 2017).
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drought characteristics according to the conﬁguration of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability (Figure 1). This
enables the speciﬁcation of second- and third-tier variables which can be used to characterize the risks of
droughts and assess the capacity and effectiveness of institutional adaptations (Kallis, 2008). Table 1
illustrates an indicative set of such tiered variables to assess the characteristics of drought hazards,
exposure, and vulnerability across the components of the SES. Such variables can offer an initial basis for
measuring the risks of drought, tracking their propagation across complex systems, and assessing the
inﬂuence of transboundary water governance on the distribution of risks and capacity to manage the
associated trade-offs.
The second extension to the IAD-SES responds to the transboundary and systemic nature of droughts
(Grafton et al., 2016; Wyrwoll et al., 2018), namely: the propensity for drought impacts to propagate across
jurisdictional boundaries when upstream adaptation decisions cascade downstream, creating “spillovers”
(Figure 1). The concept of spillovers is not new; it has been closely associated with the concept of extern-
alities, which refers to the costs or beneﬁts of decisions that are ignored by decision makers. Although
spillovers and externalities are used interchangeably (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1961, p. 832), spillovers offer more
precision in the context of transboundary river basins. Spillovers are often associated with the spatial
Table 1
Selected Second-Tier and Third-Tier Variables for Characterizing Drought in a Transboundary Context
Second-tier variables Third-tier variables Hazard Exposure Vulnerability
Resource units (RU)
RU4: Economic value Livelihoods
Economic value of water and water-related assets
RU7: Spatial and temporal distribution Rainfall interannual and intraannual variability
Drought severity (intensity and duration)
Resource system (RS)
RS1: Sectors Water
RS2: Size Basin area
RS7: Predictability of system dynamics Hydroclimatic variability
RS8: Storage characteristics Reservoir storage-to-runoff ratio
Aquifer storage capacity and recharge properties
Actors (A)
A1: Number of actors Population, sectors and jurisdictions
A2: Socioeconomic attributes Income
Group heterogeneity
A4: Location Upstream/Downstream
A7: Knowledge Early warning and other predictive capacity
A8: Resource dependence Irrigated agriculture
Water-dependence of industry
Environmental needs
A9: Technologies Irrigation efﬁciency
Governance system (GS)a
GS4: Property rights systems Allocation rules
Shortage sharing rules
GS5: Operational rules Roles and responsibilities
GS6: Collective-choice rules Decision rules
Conﬂict resolution rules
Coordination rules
GS7: Constitutional rules Intergovernmental agreements
GS8: Monitoring and sanctioning Information sharing
Note. Source = own elaboration, following Meinzen-Dick (2007) and based on Wilhite (2000) for the “hazard” column, Carrão et al. (2016) for the “exposure” col-
umn, and Garrick et al. (2013) and Garrick and De Stefano (2016) for the “vulnerability” column.
aThis table identiﬁes only focal attributes for transboundary river governance, not the wider set of governance attributes associated with local management.
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relationship between adjacent actors or jurisdictions and closely related to issues of scale (Ostrom et al.,
1961, p. 833). In principle, spillovers, like externalities, can include both risks and beneﬁts. An example
of a spillover risk involves the negative effects of upstream groundwater pumping on downstream
surface water reliability. Conversely, an example of a spillover beneﬁt involves management of upstream
reservoir storage to create drought buffers for both upstream and downstream jurisdictions. In the
terminology of the IAD framework, we conceptualize spillovers as a form of “interaction” between
upstream and downstream jurisdictions and expect that adjacent jurisdictions will become more
interdependent during droughts (Figure 1).
The need for coordination is particularly pronounced in transboundary river basins due to the spillovers
between jurisdictions and levels of governance within a shared basin. Political borders can create trans-
boundary management challenges between and within countries. In federal countries, for example, authority
is divided between national and subnational jurisdictions (i.e., states), creating the potential for coordination
challenges when multiple, independent states share a river basin. Federal rivers are major river basins within
or shared by a federal country, where coordination dilemmas can arise between sectors (e.g., intrastate
rivers), states (e.g., interstate rivers), and across international borders (e.g., international rivers); some federal
river basins have the dual challenge of coordination across multiple countries and multiple states within
them (see Figure 2). Sharing water in transboundary settings is difﬁcult even under average water availability.
Drought may bring into sharp relief neglected interdependencies or blur roles and responsibilities, leading
to disputes between jurisdictions or across levels of governance (Garrick & De Stefano, 2016; Garrick
et al., 2016).
Figure 2. World’s federal rivers: Transboundary basins at nested levels, following Garrick and De Stefano (2016).
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To unpack drought adaptation in a transboundary context, we draw on institutional collective action
theory and its typology of “integration mechanisms” for responding to intergovernmental coordination
dilemmas (Feiock, 2013). Integration mechanisms are needed to allow governments to address interde-
pendencies across functions (e.g., ﬁsh and wildlife and water resources), jurisdictions (e.g., upstream and
downstream states), or levels of government (e.g., local versus state or national). Coordination and coop-
eration to resolve these dilemmas require effective decision-making venues to bridge across sectors,
scales, and jurisdictions.
Institutional collective action (ICA) theory posits that decision-making venues—both formal and informal—
are the means by which spillovers are addressed among governments. Coordination venues will vary accord-
ing to their scope (single issue versus multidimensional) and authority (from informal to formal). The func-
tioning of these venues is governed by rules, that is, collective choice rules, and ultimately also
constitutional choice rules (see Table 1, GS6 and GS7). The scope and authority of coordination venues are
a function of two variables: the beneﬁts of cooperation (i.e., the consequences of failing to cooperate) and
costs of doing so (i.e., the transaction costs of coordinated action). In short, decision-making venues will
increase in scope and authority when the beneﬁts of collective action exceed the costs of such collective
action. In practical terms this will mean that informal venues focused on a narrow set of issues may be sufﬁ-
cient until severe droughts intensify and lead to spillovers. Severe, sustained droughts may require more sig-
niﬁcant responses of greater formality and scope, such as creating a conﬂict resolution venue or a river basin
authority to coordinate complex trade-offs. A typology of integration mechanisms can be organized in terms
of their formality and scope, as delineated in Table 2 (based on Feiock, 2013).
There are several implications of institutional collective action theory for transboundary drought adaptation.
Second-best options are often necessary in a given setting due to transaction costs. Thus, actors are likely to
experiment with the least costly integration mechanisms before turning to the more comprehensive and
formal mechanisms. Second, the implication of the ﬁrst point is that the less costly options will often be
favored. Finally, experimentation will follow the principle of subsidiarity, as actors directly affected by func-
tional overlaps or spillovers engage in adaptation decisions; higher-level authorities (e.g., courts) serve as a
second best option.
1.2. Propositions
We apply the risk-based IAD-SES framework and the theory of institutional collective action to examine evi-
dence for three propositions:
Table 2
Typology of Decision-Making Venues to Address Institutional Collective Action (ICA) Dilemmas (Adapted From Feiock, 2013)
Integration mechanisms Description
Drought adaptation
(indicative venues)
Single issue
Informal networks Policy network that emerges from local interactions Sharing shortages with neighbors
Contracts Joint ventures and service contracts to address externalities Dry-year option contract
Special purpose districts Functionally specialized jurisdiction separate from local government Irrigation district board decisions
Multilateral
Working groups Voluntary association of elected or public ofﬁcials Weekly phone calls for reservoir
operations working group
Partnerships Voluntary multilateral agreement among local jurisdictions Memorandum of understanding on
shortage sharing between jurisdictions
Multipurpose districts Consolidated set of public services within geographic territory Drought response by watershed
or regional organizations
Comprehensive
Multiplex self-organizing systems Emergence of regional integration through embedded norms
created by overlapping ventures, agreements and contracts
Drought forum by river basin
stakeholder groups
Council of governments Coordination across multiple policy domains governed
by statutory framework
Interstate task force on drought
Regional authorities Regional authorities have a comprehensive scope across a set
of functions within a speciﬁed geography
Drought planning by river basin authority
Note. The integration mechanisms are listed by scope (single issue, multilateral, or comprehensive) and then by the level authority and formality within each
category (e.g., special purpose districts require more formal authority than informal networks).
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Drought in transboundary context. The institutions for transboundary water management (GS) will inﬂuence
vulnerability to droughts.
Proposition 1: Transboundary water agreements inﬂuence the nature and propagation of drought impacts
within the basin by shaping how local decisions spillover through their rules, drought measures, and dispute
resolution mechanisms.
Spillovers. In general, drought is likely to lead to tensions and disputes with uncertain consequences among
upstream and downstream actors. With the onset of drought, actors may protect their own interests and
those of their constituents affecting downstream jurisdictions in the absence of well-functioning
integration mechanisms.
Proposition 2: Meeting downstreamwater delivery obligations during droughts will lead to disputes between
jurisdictions and confusion about key roles and responsibilities.
Integration mechanisms. While drought may lead to disputes, actors are likely to access or form various inte-
gration mechanisms in response. In general, actors will turn to the least costly mechanisms to support coor-
dination, which are often informal and involve information sharing and are supported by well-functioning
monitoring mechanisms. In the most severe, sustained droughts, such informal mechanisms may not
be sufﬁcient.
Proposition 3: Actors will cooperate by using relatively low-cost integration mechanisms available to them in
responding to drought impacts, but informal arrangements will not be sufﬁcient on their own to address spil-
lovers during severe, sustained droughts.
We ﬁrst examine the hotspots of severe droughts and institutional fragmentation, highlighting a small set of
river basins in federal political systems. We then examine these propositions in the Rio Grande/Bravo river
system of the United States and Mexico, which offer a paradigmatic example of a transboundary river system
with a history of severe droughts.
2. Settings and Methods
2.1. Setting
A global analysis compared the mean drought severity for the historic period from 1901 to 2008
(Shefﬁeld & Wood, 2008). Overlaying this indicator with the world’s federal rivers (Figure 3) highlights
the regions where exposure to severe droughts and jurisdictional fragmentation coexist. This analysis
highlights three transboundary rivers as prime examples of federal rivers under pressure from severe
droughts: the Rio Grande/Bravo, Nile, and Indus. Other regions in Northern Africa and the Middle East,
Russia, South America, and northern Australia experience severe droughts. The Rio Grande, Nile, and
Indus are unique, however, due to their status as international rivers with one or more federal countries
and hence high degrees of institutional fragmentation. The inset maps in Figure 3 illustrate that the Rio
Grande/Bravo is also distinct from the Nile and the Indus due to its exposure to severe droughts through-
out the full basin—in particular, including its headwaters regions in the Upper Rio Grande (United States)
and Rio Conchos (Mexico). As such the Rio Grande/Bravo offers a paradigmatic example of a transbound-
ary river exposed to severe drought that can generate insights about the nature of drought in such
settings and the evolution and effectiveness of institutional responses to coordination challenges at
multiple scales.
On the basis of this global mapping, we focus on the Rio Grande/Bravo Basin as a laboratory for investigat-
ing institutional adaptation to droughts in a transboundary (interstate and international) setting. The basin
(approximately 870,000 km2 including endorheic zones) includes two countries (United States and Mexico)
with three U.S. states and ﬁve Mexican states (Figure 4). The physical and political geography of the basin
has positioned both the United States and Mexico as the “upstream” riparian country on a major tributary
before reaching the main stem of the river and forming the border between the countries for approxi-
mately 2,000 km. This allows a comparison of local and transboundary adaptation within both countries,
controlling for the upstream-downstream position, in addition to the focus on international cooperation
and conﬂict. The United States and Mexico also differ in their levels of centralization and approaches to
coordination between upstream and downstream states within each country, which allows a comparison
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of Mexico’s relatively centralized governance arrangements with the relatively decentralized approaches in
the United States. Finally, as a consequence of the ﬁrst two elements, the basin has evolved a complex
institutional matrix of surface water agreements to share water and shortage risks within and across
jurisdictions, which has created distinct and coherent subzones, or institutional “catchments”—the spatial
portion of a basin whose administrative boundaries are deﬁned by the compliance points for transboundary
water agreements.
2.2. Institutional Catchments
International and interstate water sharing agreements create obligations for upstream jurisdictions to deliver
water downstream. Compliance locations for monitoring deliveries form the boundaries between distinct, yet
interlinked, institutional catchments. We focus on four institutional catchments: the San Luis Valley, Upper
and Middle Rio Grande, Rio Conchos, and Lower Rio Grande Valley. The ﬁrst two institutional catchments
are deﬁned by the Rio Grande Interstate River Compact, a water sharing agreement between the U.S. states
of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, and the 1906 Convention between the United States and Mexico. The
remaining two catchments are deﬁned by the 1944 treaty between the United States and Mexico, which
allocates water between the two countries from the Rio Grande/Bravo and the Colorado rivers. The water
Figure 3. Drought severity in federal rivers, following Shefﬁeld and Wood (2008, drought severity) and Garrick and De Stefano (2016, federal rivers). Polygons (black)
refer to interstate federal rivers (within countries) and the federal portion of international rivers with at least one federal country.
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agreements further subdivide these zones. Speciﬁcally, the Upper and Middle Rio Grande is typically
subdivided into two parts upstream and downstream of Elephant Butte reservoir in New Mexico, and the
Lower Rio Grande is typically divided into the U.S. portion and the Mexican portion, particularly the San
Juan Basin.
The San Luis Valley is situated at the headwaters of the Rio Grande cradled by the Rocky Mountains. Snowmelt
from 4,000 m mountains feed the surface water hydrology, supporting a high-altitude valley that is 2,345 m
above sea level and spans a territory of almost 8,300 km (Cody et al., 2015). The downstream boundary of this
institutional catchment stretches into New Mexico at the Otowi Bridge streamﬂow gauge. The Upper and
Middle Rio Grande stretches from the Otowi Bridge, near Espanola, New Mexico to the Elephant Butte
Reservoir, some 370 km in distance, and then to Fort Quitman, Texas, near the beginning of the international
border. For New Mexico, compact compliance is measured by the volume of water shepherded down the
river and stored in Elephant Butte Reservoir. Elephant Butte Reservoir is central for the compact’s water allo-
cation rules and compliance. Under the requirements of the interstate compact, NewMexico deliveries to the
reservoir are proportionate to the volume of water passing the Otowi gauge. The compact also allows
Colorado and New Mexico to accrue water debits and credits, which are measured and accounted for at
the Elephant Butte Reservoir. The Conchos River ﬂows fall entirely within the state of Chihuahua, Mexico. It
is the most important tributary of the Lower Rio Grande, providing around 40%–70% of its ﬂow (von der
Figure 4. The Rio Bravo / Grande Basin. Basin-state units represent the spatial portion of the basin falling within speciﬁc states in Mexico (Bravo) and the United
States (Grande). Four institutional catchments have been delineated according to the boundaries established by surface water agreements: The San Luis Valley
(Colorado to the Otowi Bridge, New Mexico); the Upper and Middle Rio Grande (from Otowi Bridge to Fort Quitman); the Rio Conchos (to its conﬂuence with the Rio
Grande); and the Lower Rio Grande (which encompasses Texas and important tributaries in Mexico).
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Meden et al., 2010). La Boquilla reservoir is located upstream in the Conchos River. With a storage capacity of
more than 2.9 billion cubic meters, the reservoir serves the irrigation district 5 of Delicias (82,300 ha of irrig-
able land), a number of traditional irrigation systems, and the city of Delicias (148,045 inhabitants, 2015). The
El Granero reservoir (Luis L. Leon dam) is located by the mid-Conchos valley, has a storage capacity of 356
million cubic meters and serves the Irrigation District 90, Bajo Conchos (13,300 ha), a few traditional irrigation
systems, and the 1944 Treaty payments to the United States. The Lower Rio Grande Valley includes the United
States and Mexico and is served by two international reservoirs, the Falcon and Amistad, which allow the
United States and Mexico to administer the water allocations provided for in the 1944 treaty. The reservoirs
are the compliance point in the lower Rio Grande Valley between the two countries. Within the Lower Rio
Grande valley, the U.S. portion and the San Juan tributary within Mexico constitute discrete institutional
catchments, which are not included in the analysis.
The water sharing agreements created venues for their administration. The International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC) administers the 1944 treaty and 1906 convention and operates the two international reser-
voirs, Falcon and Amistad (Wurbs, 2004). In addition, each country has also established governance arrange-
ments for coordinating interstate water management within their territory. The interstate compact between
Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas relies on a proportionate water allocation rule. The amount of water that
(i) Colorado must deliver to New Mexico and (ii) New Mexico to the Elephant Butte Reservoir is a function of
the volume of river ﬂows. Higher ﬂows require greater volumes of water to be passed downstream. Mexico,
in contrast, organizes its water sharing according to the 1992 National Water Law, which vests planning and
allocation in a national water agency, Comisión Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA; Hearne, 2004). CONAGUA
has delegations at the basin and state levels. Basin-scale delegations are integrated within river basin organi-
zations (RBOs). The RBOs also host river basin councils (“consejos”) which aim to provide a platform for enga-
ging major user groups and other stakeholders within the basin (Castelan, 2001). Coordination between
CONAGUA’s national and state ofﬁces occurs through centralized decision-making administered by the state
ofﬁces, although reforms in the 1992 National Water Law have attempted to decentralize and restructure func-
tions associated with irrigation management andmunicipal water supplies. Coordination between CONAGUA,
state governments, and user groups is expected to happen, at the advisory level, within RBOs.
2.3. Methods
Our analysis involves two steps. First, we examine proposition 1 using primary data on drought, water avail-
ability and documentary evidence regarding three focal attributes interacting with droughts: urbanization,
groundwater availability and use, and environmental issues. Second, we examine propositions 2 and 3
regarding spillover effects and integration mechanisms using a questionnaire administered as a component
of a set of semistructured interviews. The semistructured interviews addressed: the respondent’s role in
drought adaptation; characteristics, impacts, and responses to drought; roles, responsibilities, and relation-
ships among key actors in drought adaptation; decision-making venues; funding and capacity, and perfor-
mance (see supporting information for a detailed description of data collection). For the spillover effects
and integration mechanisms, we summarize the results of the ordinal Likert scale (ordinal scale with ﬁve
levels from strongly agree to strongly disagree) for statements posed during the close-ended questions of
semistructured interviews. The results are summarized at the basin level and then disaggregated to explore
variation across institutional catchments within the basin. The comparisons across the subbasin were
assessed using Fischer’s exact tests to determine the strength of association, which is suited for contingency
tables involving small to medium sized N (see supporting information for results of the tests).
3. Results
3.1. Proposition I
Transboundary water agreements inﬂuence the nature and propagation of drought impacts within the basin
by shaping how local decisions spillover through their rules, drought measures, and dispute resolution.
The framework indicates that droughts in transboundary rivers need to be understood in terms of the char-
acteristics of the drought (hazard), the population and assets potentially affected (exposure), and the local
and transboundary water governance capacity (vulnerability). We examine how drought varies and propa-
gates in a transboundary context in four steps: (i) assessing the history of drought and its spatial–temporal
distribution, (ii) characterizing the water management institutions that govern water sharing and drought
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risks across state and international borders, (iii) identifying how drought risks interact with exposure
characteristics related to urbanization, irrigation development, and environmental quality, and (iv)
documenting the spillovers, both positive and negative, linking different institutional catchments
during droughts.
Hazard. Drought is a recurrent, natural phenomenon involving a temporary deﬁcit in runoff, precipitation,
and/or soil moisture whose impact and management are highly context speciﬁc. This is because drought sets
off as a natural event—that is, a period of precipitation below average—but it rapidly evolves into a human-
constructed phenomenon where drought impacts are largely determined by the characteristics of the
human systems experiencing the meteorological drought.
In the case of Rio Grande/Bravo basin, the characterization of drought and its effects has a double complexity.
On one hand, the large size of the basin, its north-south orientation (with a latitude spanning from 37° to 25°),
and the geographical conﬁguration of its subbasins mean that drought manifests across the basin unevenly
in terms of precipitation and natural runoff deﬁcits. For instance, Woodhouse et al. (2012) analyzed historic
data and tree rings to conclude that precipitation and streamﬂow from the San Juan Mountains (headwater
of Rio Grande) and the Sierra Madre Occidental in Mexico (headwater of Conchos) are largely independent
from each other and therefore droughts in San Luis Valley and the Conchos are rarely concurrent. Those
authors observed that periods of concurrent multiyear drought over the past four centuries were rare, with
records of concurrence in the 1770s, 1890s, and 1950s. This trend is also found comparing spatial and tem-
poral variability in water availability indicators during the 1970–2016 period (Figure 5). Differences exist
not only in the timing of rainfall deﬁcits but also in how runoff is generated across the basin, with snowmelt
being the main source of runoff in the Upper Rio Grande, monsoon rainfalls in the Conchos subbasin, and
hurricanes in the Lower Basin. Additionally, there are a number of reservoirs that shape hydrological ﬂows
and water availability and help understand the boundaries of a series of institutional catchments within
the basin (see below).
Exposure. The exposure to drought in the basin varies according to water use (irrigation and urban demand),
population (urbanization), and environmental assets (species and habitats at risk). We catalog and compare
these dimensions across the four institutional catchments to illustrate the heterogeneity of the basin in terms
of the level (low, moderate, or high) in each of these aspects of exposure (Table 3).
As in many other regions of the world, irrigated agriculture is the largest water user across the basin, and the
availability of groundwater and storage capacity provided by reservoirs inﬂuence vulnerability to drought in
each zone. In the San Luis Valley, conﬁned and unconﬁned aquifers are key water sources for irrigation both
in average and dry periods, while in-stream ﬂows rapidly decrease and are affected by surface water curtail-
ments during dry spells. Groundwater overdraft, however, has caused the decline of water tables and of in-
stream ﬂows where the river and the aquifer are hydraulically connected. This has reduced the buffering
capacity of aquifers during drought and questions the viability of the current water exploitation model.
In the Middle Rio Grande, groundwater pumping emerged in the 1950s as a way for farmers to compensate
curtailment of surface water rights during droughts. As in San Luis Valley, this adaptation strategy has
brought about water table declines and conﬂicts over in-stream ﬂows that are affected by groundwater
pumping. Groundwater pumping by farmers downstream of Elephant Butte Reservoir led the Bureau of
Reclamation, which operates the reservoir, and the city of El Paso to express concerns over the effects of
groundwater pumping on surface water ﬂows, illustrating how upstream adaptation decisions cause down-
stream spillovers in a transboundary context. While the Elephant Butte Irrigation District (EBID) attempted
to negotiate with the Bureau, El Paso Water Improvement Distrct (EPWID), and Texas to resolve the issue,
Figure 5. Spatial and temporal variation in water availability indicators, listed from upstream to downstream. Red line indicates periods when the observed variable
was below the average of the whole series during more than two consecutive years.
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New Mexico chose not to participate in the process. Rather, once the parties reached and implemented an
agreement, New Mexico ﬁled suit claiming the agreement violated the Compact. Texas, in turn, ﬁled a law-
suit with the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court, in 2013, agreed to hear the case. In 2017, the
special master appointed by the Supreme Court to oversee the proceedings found in favor of Texas. If
the U.S. Supreme Court accepts the special master’s ﬁndings, New Mexico will have to address the impacts
of groundwater pumping on surface water ﬂows. Furthermore, Texas is requesting compensation for
decades of lost water.
In the Conchos basin, irrigated agriculture withdraws about 2,900 Mm3/year, with similar shares of surface
water stored in eight dams and groundwater abstracted from 17 aquifers (González, 2008). Efforts to meet
downstream commitments to the United States under the international treaty have required reductions in
water for local agriculture, illustrating how downstream compliance can lead to spillovers upstream and
set up complex efforts to improve local water use efﬁciency and changes in reservoir operations (Barrios
et al., 2009).
Environmental issues are particularly salient in the Middle Rio Grande upstream of Elephant Butte reservoir,
where compliance with the Endangered Species Act requires the maintenance of speciﬁc in-stream ﬂows
to help in recovering the silvery minnow, which was listed as endangered in 1994. Since that time, the major
federal water agencies and local water users have created a collaborative program to protect and possibly
recover the species, illustrating how drought interacts with exposure of environmental assets within a trans-
boundary context. In the Conchos basin and in the San Luis Valley, environmental nongovernmental organi-
zation are increasingly drawing public attention to environmental degradation of aquatic ecosystems and
lobbying for the assignment of dedicated water volumes for the implementation of environmental-ﬂows
regimes to protect or restore aquatic ecosystems.
Vulnerability. The capacity to manage droughts varies signiﬁcantly across the basin, inﬂuenced by water
resource development and the distribution of water and shortage risks under transboundary water agree-
ments. Water resources development affects vulnerability to droughts through the availability of reservoir
storage and groundwater pumping capacity. In the upper basin, surface water users have to rely almost
exclusively on in-stream ﬂows generated by snowmelt during spring (April–June), as surface storage capacity
in the San Luis Valley is very limited. In this institutional catchment, groundwater serves as a signiﬁcant buffer
during droughts, when water users with junior entitlements switch to the aquifer to compensate for curtail-
ment of surface water. In the other institutional catchments, the effects of meteorological drought are buf-
fered by well-developed surface storage capacity and, in the Middle Rio Grande, also by the availability of
groundwater resources. Stored volumes at each time are determined by both rainfall and operation deci-
sions, which, in turn, have to address legal obligations applicable in each case (interstate Compact;
International treaty; minimum in-stream ﬂows required by the Endangered Species Act) and the needs of
local water users.
The existing intergovernmental water sharing agreements and governing arrangements are especially
important determinants of vulnerability, which inﬂuence the distribution of impacts and capacity for
responding to droughts (Table 4). The design of these transboundary water sharing agreements matters in
three ways: (1) rules for sharing water, (2) provisions for declaring droughts and sharing shortage risks, and
(3) their mechanisms for dispute resolution and adjustment. In the United States, the interstate river
Table 3
Institutional Catchments
Reservoirs
(capacity)
Groundwater
development
Urban growth
(# of cities > 50,000 inhab) Irrigation development
Environmental
issues
Institutional catchment RS8 RU3/RS8 A8 A8 RU6/A8
San Luis Valley, CO, USA 445 Mm3; HIGH None HIGH Emerging
Upper and middle Rio Grande, USA 3804 Mm3; HIGH 4 HIGH Endangered species (silvery
minnow)
Rio Conchos, Chihuahua, Mexico 6116 Mm3; HIGH 4 HIGH Habitat (desert riparian)
Lower Rio Grande Valley, TX, USA 10237 Mm3 LOW 4 HIGH Water quality
(industrial pollutants)
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compact’s water allocation rules are of a proportional character, which takes into account variability in river
ﬂows (Vandiver, 1999). A proportional rule allocates water among recipients based on a percentage or por-
tion of the actual ﬂow of water, which distributes the risk of water shortages among the recipients. At higher
river ﬂows, Colorado is to deliver a larger volume of water to NewMexico. Likewise, at higher river ﬂows, New
Mexico is to deliver a larger volume of water to the Elephant Butte Reservoir. Thus, both states’water delivery
obligations are a function of river ﬂows (Reynolds & Mutz, 1974). The Compact provides for additional ﬂexibil-
ity by recognizing that during times of water scarcity, states may underdeliver the required amounts of water.
Underdelivery may occur for a variety of reasons, such as the condition of the riverbed and seepage or the
difﬁculty of shutting down irrigation midseason. Colorado and New Mexico are allowed to run water debits
up to a speciﬁed volume. They are also allowed to overdeliver water and build up credits, which are stored in
the Elephant Butte Reservoir and which they may use to meet their water delivery requirements at a later
date. These transboundary arrangements also require institutional capacity. The compact commission relies
on a technical committee to monitor interstate water deliveries and debits and credits. The commission
meets annually to review the technical committee’s report. In addition, the proportionate sharing of water
is applied to the 1906 Agreement with Mexico. During years when the two U.S. irrigation districts received
a full allotment of water, the Mexican Irrigation District receives a full allotment of 74 million cubic meters.
During drought years, each irrigation district’s allotment is reduced proportionally, For instance, if the U.S. irri-
gation districts receive 75% of a full allotment, the Mexican Irrigation District receives 75% of the 74 million
cubic meters. Under this allocation rule, water deliveries to Mexico under the 1906 agreement have been
reduced in approximately one of every three years since 1939 (Carter et al., 2015).
While the two upstream institutional catchments are governed by a series of proportionate water allocation
rules, the Lower Rio Grande Valley, Texas, is governed by a different set of water allocation rules (Wurbs,
2004). Under the 1944 Water Treaty, Mexico owes the United States 432 million cubic meters of water per
year, or a third of the estimated annual runoff of six major tributaries that is accounted for over a 5-year time
period to permit variability in year-to-year water availability. In other words, the water allocation rule in the
treaty is a ﬁxed amount rule. A ﬁxed water allocation rule places the burden of water scarcity on the
Table 4
Institutional Catchments and Transboundary Governance Arrangements for Droughts
Institutional
catchment
Constitutional
agreements
(intergovernmental) Boundaries Allocation rules
Transboundary
drought
management
GS8 RS2 GS4 GS4
San Luis Valley, CO, USA 1938 Rio Grande Compact;
1906 International Convention
Headwaters to
Otowi Bridge, NM
Proportional share of
available water (interstate)
Credit and debit
system (interstate)
Proportional shortage
sharing (international)
Upper and Middle
Rio Grande, USA
1938 Rio Grande Compact;
1906 International Convention
Otowi Bridge, NM to
Fort Quitman, TX
Proportional share of available
water (interstate)
Fixed volume from the
United States to
Mexico (international)
Credit and debit
system (interstate)
Proportional shortage
sharing (international)
Rio Conchos,
Chihuahua, Mexico
1992 National Water Law;
1944 Water Treaty
Headwaters of Conchos
to Rio Bravo
Water use right concessions
Coordinated by national
government (interstate)
432 million cubic meters based
on the estimated volume from
33.3% of runoff from six
Mexican tributaries
(international)
Central coordination
(interstate)
5-year cycle of water
accounting with debit
scheme (international)
Lower Rio Grande
Valley, TX, USA
1944 Water Treaty Falcon and Amistad Reservoirs
to Gulf of Mexico
Texas adjudicates municipal and
agricultural water rights in
Falcon and Amistad Reservoirs
Municipal water rights
always receive full water
allocation; agricultural
water rights receive
reduced allocation,
depending on type of
right (intrastate)
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upstream actor, in this case the Rio Conchos, Mexico water users. The 1944 Treaty incorporates ﬂexibility and
buffers drought impacts through its 5-year accounting period and allows Mexico to repay debts during the
subsequent 5-year period. The Treaty also created an implementing body—the International Boundary
and Water Commission—which offers technical support and a platform for developing “minutes,” or memor-
anda of understanding, between the countries over emerging issues, which has included the management of
droughts and repayment of debts (e.g., Minutes 307 and 308 amending the 1944 treaty and adopted in the
early 2000s). The water users of the Lower Rio Grande Valley have had their rights in the water stored in the
Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs adjudicated in a court proceeding. Municipal and industrial water rights are
fully satisﬁed, regardless of the type of water year (drought or normal). The water rights of irrigation districts
are divided into two types, A and B, based on priority. B rights are the ﬁrst to lose water during drought.
Depending on the severity of drought, A rights may also not receive water. Agriculture absorbs the impacts
of drought under this system.
Spillovers. The characterization of drought in the Rio Grande/Bravo system illustrates how the distribution of
drought impacts is inﬂuenced by the combination of the spatial and temporal patterns of drought coupled
with differences in exposure and vulnerability. Transboundary water institutions create a set of downstream
water delivery obligations that connect upstream and downstream adaptation decisions and create potential
for spillovers. These spillovers have included both beneﬁcial linkages and risks. Positive spillovers include
improved compliance and cooperation between states and countries via implementing organizations. For
example, the San Luis Valley took several steps in the 1970s to improve its compliance with the 1938
Compact, delivering water for the Middle Rio Grande above and below Elephant Butte. The implementing
organizations for the transboundary agreements—both the Rio Grande Commission and IBWC—have also
fostered positive spillovers through monitoring and information gathering, dispute resolution and risk
sharing. For example, the IBWC has 323 min since the 1940s (as of 15 March 2018), many involving coopera-
tion between the United States and Mexico to deal with the impacts of droughts, such as the repayment
sources (Minute 307) and schedule (Minute 308) for Mexico’s debt to the United States.
Spillover risks have been prevalent and caused disputes, however, in part due to the location of the
compliance points and the ability to account for groundwater. For example, the location of the compliance
point at Elephant Butte has meant that New Mexico’s deliveries to Texas must travel almost 150 km within
New Mexico before reaching the Texas border, leaving the water vulnerable to interception by ground-
water pumping. Groundwater pumping in both the San Luis Valley and Middle Rio Grande (in the region
between Elephant Butte and the Texas border) have created spillover risks. Another spillover risk is
illustrated by the investments in infrastructure improvements (paving of ditches, sprinkler irrigation) in
the upper Rio Conchos, which have reduced runoff downstream of the river but potentially also reduced
silting in the main reservoir that serves the payments to the Lower Rio Grande Valley. At the same time,
some institutional catchments are functionally distinct with limited or no direct interaction. For example,
the Middle Rio Grande (and upstream) are largely disconnected from the Rio Conchos and Lower Rio
Grande Valley, which are primarily linked to one another. The examples above illustrate a sequencing,
or cycle, of spillovers, starting with the agreement, followed by the risks associated with failure to comply,
which triggers cooperative efforts. Thus, conﬂict between institutional catchments prompts dispute reso-
lution that has often been cooperative. The next two propositions therefore address spillover risks and
integration mechanisms in turn.
3.2. Proposition 2
Meeting downstream water delivery obligations during droughts will lead to conﬂict between jurisdictions
and confusion about key roles and responsibilities.
Spillovers. Upstream and downstream jurisdictions are linked by both hydrology and institutional arrange-
ments, as examined above. Consequently, as water users and managers respond to drought, they may create
spillovers for adjoining users and jurisdictions. Expected water deliveries may not materialize, or increased
groundwater pumping may reduce surface water ﬂows, or failure to communicate may mean opportunities
to use water more efﬁciently are missed. Thus, compliance with water-sharing agreements during droughts
will lead to conﬂict between jurisdictions and across levels of governance and confusion about key roles and
responsibilities (Proposition 2).
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We assess evidence for the second proposition by examining the Likert
scale responses to ﬁve statements associated with the spillover risks of
droughts (see supporting information). We summarize results at the basin
level, by institutional catchment and across sectors.
Basin-wide. At the basin level, we ﬁnd evidence for the proposition
(Figure 6). Most of the water managers interviewed (>85% of responses,
Q1) agreed with the statement “the roles and responsibilities of key actors
are clear during periods of normal water availability.” The institutional
arrangements supported stable expectations about water managers’
actions. The level of agreement declined to 65% (Q2) when asked if roles
and responsibilities are clear during droughts.
Furthermore, most water managers (almost 85%, Q10) agreed that
droughts lead to conﬂict between states sharing water within the basin.
Compliance with downstream water delivery obligations under treaties
and interstate compacts causes tensions among upstream jurisdictions
according to over 60% (Q4) of respondents. Droughts are often
associated with increasing central government responsibility as the
severity and duration of the dry spell increase; yet perspectives on
the role of the federal government were mixed. Only 40% agreed with
the statement (Q3), “the federal government has expanded its scope
to cover functions historically addressed by states or local governments”
(Figure 6). This implies that horizontal (between states) coordination
challenges are perceived as more severe than vertical tensions between
states and the federal government.
3.3. By Institutional Catchments
We expect that local conditions (including the exposure and vulnerability to drought) will shape perceptions
of water managers, leading to variation between the different institutional catchments regarding their per-
ceptions of spillover risks and responses. In breaking down the responses to the same questions by the
San Luis Valley, Upper and Middle Rio Grande, Rio Conchos, and Lower Rio Grande Valley, some signiﬁcant
differences emerge among water managers. Over a third of water managers in the Upper and Middle Rio
Grande perceive water management roles and responsibilities to be unclear during drought, while none of
the managers in the Lower Rio Grande Valley claimed that roles were clear unclear during drought (see
Fisher exact tests in the supporting information). The water allocation arrangements in the Lower Rio
Grande Valley are well speciﬁed during normal water years and drought years. Municipalities receive their full
water allocations during normal and drought water years. In contrast, irrigation districts share water scarcity
during drought as a function of their water rights. The water allocation arrangements in the Upper and
Middle Rio Grande catchment are not as well speciﬁed and therefore more contentious, particularly due to
the effects of groundwater pumping and the additional pressure of meeting downstream obligations.
Upstream versus downstream position also appears to affect perceptions regarding roles and responsibilities
and regarding compliance (Q2 and Q4 respectively). All of the water managers interviewed in the Conchos
and most of them in the Lower Rio Grande Valley agree that compliance with international surface water
agreements to deliver water to downstream countries cause disputes among the upstream jurisdictions with
responsibility to make the deliveries, but for different reasons. For the Conchos managers they consistently
experience pressure to deliver water to meet international treaty obligations. For the Lower Rio Grande
Valley managers they consistently perceive that Mexico underdelivers water, and they observe upstream-
downstream disputes within Mexico to meet international obligations. In contrast, in the Upper Rio Grande
and San Luis Valley, approximately 20% of interviewees agreed that downstream delivery obligations to
Mexico cause disputes among upstream jurisdictions within the United States. Colorado and New Mexico
water managers meet their water delivery obligations at the Otowi Bridge and the Elephant Butte reservoir,
respectively. The delivery of water from the United States to Mexico under the 1906 Convention is seen as
“riding above” the other downstream commitments and is the responsibility of the Bureau of Reclamation
and IBWC.
Figure 6. Water manager perceptions of spillovers: Basin-wide results
(n = 50). SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; N = Neither Agree nor Disagree;
D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree. Q1: The roles and responsibilities of
water management agencies are clear during normal times. Q2: The roles
and responsibilities of water management agencies are clear during
drought. Q3: The role of federal agencies has expanded to cover functions
historically reserved for states or water users. Q4: Compliance with
downstream delivery requirements under a speciﬁed international surface
water agreement causes conﬂicts between upstream jurisdictions. Q10:
Droughts lead to conﬂicts between states.
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We generally ﬁnd support for proposition 2. Across the basin, water
managers perceive drought as leading to a lack of clarity around roles
and responsibilities of water agencies. In addition, droughts are perceived
as creating conﬂicts among states and among upstream Mexican states
with international delivery obligations to the United States under the
1944 Water Treaty. However, at the catchment scale perceptions become
a bit more nuanced and appear to be conditioned by institutional arrange-
ments and location in the river basin, which underscores the need for
effective integration mechanisms tailored to local conditions
and spillovers.
3.4. Proposition 3
3.4.1. Low-Cost Integration Mechanisms
Proposition 3: Actors will cooperate by using relatively low-cost integra-
tion mechanisms available to them in responding to drought impacts,
but informal arrangements will not be sufﬁcient on their own to address
spillovers during severe, sustained droughts.
The spillovers of droughts have prompted coordination and conﬂict reso-
lution between sectors, states, countries, and tiers of governance with
varying success, ranging from self-regulation in Colorado to meet delivery
requirements for New Mexico to Supreme Court litigation between New
Mexico and Texas. We expect that a range of decision-making venues will
be available for states and other stakeholders and that they will rely on informal venues, including data shar-
ing, when feasible. We explore evidence based on the level of agreement with the close-ended questions on
data sharing, the transparency of decision making processes, and efforts to cooperate and coordinate.
3.4.2. Basin-Wide
At the basin level, we ﬁnd evidence for the proposition about integration mechanisms (Figure 7). There is
broad agreement (60%, Q5) among water managers, that “organizations and agencies openly share data.”
A narrowmajority of respondents also agree with the statement that “organizations and agencies at different
levels are transparent about decision-making processes” (Q6). There is also broad agreement (>60%, Q11)
that drought leads to cooperation among states. This cooperation can take many forms, ranging from opera-
tional phone calls for reservoir coordination to working groups and memoranda of agreements between irri-
gation districts and cities in different states. However, perceptions of efforts to coordinate drought responses
between states or between states and the national government were somewhat less positive. Just over 40%
of respondents agreed that drought responses were well coordinated among governments (Q7, and Q8). In
other words, conﬂict appears to lead to cooperation, but cooperation does not guarantee
effective coordination.
3.4.3. By Institutional Catchments
Again, we expect that local conditions (including the exposure and vulnerability to drought) will shape per-
ceptions of water managers, leading to variation between the institutional catchments. The Lower Rio
Grande Valley respondents were less likely to agree with the statement that organizations and agencies
openly share data, compared to the San Luis Valley and Upper and Middle Rio Grande respondents (Q5).
This is likely due to the IBWC, an international agency that some respondents claimed is not forthcoming with
data on reservoir operations, storage, and releases. Respondents in the Conchos respond similarly, with less
than 40% agreeing that data is openly shared. In that instance, some managers noted constraints on data
sharing by the national water agency with local stakeholders.
Perceptions regarding the effectiveness of coordination between states and the federal government also
differ among institutional catchments. The participants in the Rio Conchos (>60%) held a far more favor-
able view of state-federal relations than those in the Upper Rio Grande (<10%, p = 0.05). This result, is an
unsurprising symptom of levels of decentralization. In Mexico, the vast majority of interviews included
employees of the national water agency including the managers of irrigation districts. Many respondents
signaled the importance and challenges of internal coordination from the central headquarters in Mexico
City, the regional ofﬁces and the irrigation districts, which are managed by employees of the national
Figure 7. Water manager perceptions of integration mechanisms: Basin-
wide results (n = 50). SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; N = Neither Agree
Nor Disagree; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree. Q5: Organizations and
agencies at different levels openly share data. Q6: Organizations and agen-
cies at different levels are transparent about decision-making processes. Q7:
Adaptation decisions are well coordinated between states. Q8: Adaptation
decisions are well coordinated between states and the federal government.
Q11: Droughts lead to cooperation between states.
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water agency. Conversely, in the Upper Rio Grande, the federal government has more limited formal
authority. Coordination between states and the federal governments has been challenging in relation to
decisions about reservoir operations and the administration of the Compact in the Upper and Middle
Rio Grande. Unlike the San Luis Valley and the Lower Rio Grande Valley, there is a history of lawsuits invol-
ving the federal government and endangered species and groundwater pumping in the Upper and Middle
Rio Grande.
We ﬁnd some support for proposition 3, across the basin water managers’ perceptions are that data are
openly shared and that decision making is more transparent than not. In addition, water managers believe
that drought can lead to cooperation among states. These perceptions differ by catchment and are condi-
tioned by experience. These results suggest that informal, low-cost arrangements may be beneﬁcial, but
not sufﬁcient on their own, to address the spillover risks associated with severe, sustained droughts experi-
enced in the Rio Bravo/Grande. Further, the contrasting perspectives about state-federal and interstate coor-
dination between the United States andMexico suggest that the “character,” or design, of federalismmatters.
The distribution of authority between the national and state governments has an important inﬂuence on
both the types of spillovers between jurisdictions and across levels of government. In Mexico’s more centra-
lized federation, the state-federal coordination is perceived to be comparably more effective than the United
States’ more decentralized federation.
4. Conclusions
Our analysis offers a baseline assessment of a set of propositions about the nature of droughts and decision-
making in transboundary river basins. First, drought cannot be seen as a “uniform” risk in a large transbound-
ary basin. The spatial and temporal characteristics of droughts in large basins are uneven, and this variation is
overlaid by sharp contrasts in urbanization, irrigation development, groundwater depletion, and associated
environmental quality impacts.
We advanced the IAD-SES framework in two ways. First, we integrate concepts from risk management and
the literature on the human dimensions of natural hazards to characterize droughts in terms of hazards,
exposure, and vulnerability. The subsystems of SES enable a ﬁner-grained identiﬁcation of relevant variables
and interactions. Second, we identify the spillovers associated with “upstream” adaptation decisions in large-
scale transboundary river basins, highlighting the need for appropriate coordination venues.
The risk-based IAD-SES framework is used to elaborate the concept of an “institutional catchment”—a self-
contained administrative unit whose boundaries are deﬁned by transboundary water sharing agreements
rather than watersheds. In the case of a large river basin, an institutional catchment is deﬁned by the compli-
ance locations for meeting downstream obligations. Over time, efforts to adapt to droughts upstream can
cause risks to spillover, but they can also spur new cooperative efforts, conﬂict resolution, and venues for
coordinating decision making across jurisdictional boundaries. The concept of an institutional catchment
conveys how the geographic boundaries around drought adaptation are deﬁned in relation to historic
water-sharing agreements, which have often proven ill-equipped to handle the combination of sustained
droughts and intensifying competition between sectors and jurisdictions. The agreements include compli-
ance requirements and delivery obligations that have led to sharp differences in the vulnerability, and the
impacts and management of droughts upstream will spillover.
A global map illustrates how severe droughts combine with jurisdictional fragmentation. The Rio
Grande/Bravo emerges as a paradigmatic example of a river basin with a history of severe droughts and a
complex institutional landscape that requires coordination across international borders and multiple states
within each country. We found evidence supporting three propositions. First, we demonstrated how the
design and implementation of transboundary water agreements inﬂuence vulnerability to drought risks
within and across institutional catchments, illustrating the nature and sources of heterogeneity within a
transboundary context. Second, interviews with 50 water managers across the four “institutional catchments”
allowed us to examine evidence about the spillovers of droughts. We found that roles and responsibilities
become less clear during drought, and drought leads to conﬂicts between states as a result of the tensions
associated with meeting obligations to deliver water downstream. However, local conditions and geographic
positions matter and expose asymmetries in exposure to spillovers.
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Finally, we explored the perceived effectiveness of different integration mechanisms, or decision-making
venues, for responding, including the opportunities and limits of informal mechanisms. Conﬂicts between
states over downstream compliance led to problem solving and coordination, suggesting that spillover risks
can lead to positive spillovers depending on the institutional arrangements and their capacity to resolve con-
ﬂicts both informally and formally. We expected that informal venues would be prevalent and found broad
agreement about data sharing. Informal arrangements ranged from operational phone calls for reservoir
operations to working groups among upstream and downstream irrigation districts and cities. Yet the lack
of federal-state and interstate coordination, particularly in the United States, suggests that there will be limits
to cooperation during severe, sustained drought when roles and responsibilities are unclear. Groundwater
pumping may weaken the ability of upstream jurisdictions to comply with water-sharing agreements, or lead
to informal coordination that is not deemed acceptable by state, federal, or international bodies. These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that informal coordination can prevent droughts risks from spilling over but may require more
formal coordination and conﬂict resolution mechanisms for severe, sustained events.
There are some important implications for policymakers, including the need to (i) assess institutional vulner-
ability to drought to identify and address governance deﬁcits that may exacerbate conﬂicts between jurisdic-
tions; (ii) understand trade-offs and interdependencies between jurisdictions by explicitly measuring and
mapping the “spillovers” associated with upstream adaptation decisions; and, ﬁnally, (iii) build a portfolio
of informal and formal decision-making venues to facilitate adaptation decisions that pass through informal
channels before they cascade or escalate. In the context of cascading drought impacts, risk-based observa-
tories of institutional adaptation can generate evidence to guide policy and practice.
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